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A View of the Rhode Island Pension 
Landscape:  The Potential Reform of 
Local Pension Plans Under the 
Preemption Doctrine 
Andre S. Digou* 
INTRODUCTION 
On a national scale, public debate surrounding the 
deteriorating status of pension systems and the inability of states, 
cities and towns to meet funding obligations has likely reached its 
peak.  Despite being the smallest state in the United States 
geographically, Rhode Island has been at the center of the debate 
because of unprecedented pension reform legislation enacted in 
2011.  Rhode Island, with only thirty-nine cities and towns, has 
four state-administered pension plans and thirty-six locally- 
administered pension plans.  As of June 2012, the four state-
administered plans were collectively unfunded by approximately 
$4.8 billion.  As of June 2009, the locally administered plans were 
only 43% funded and had an unfunded liability of approximately 
$1.9 billion.  While the 2011 pension reform legislation was aimed 
at rectifying the state administered plans, locally administered 
plans remain largely unaltered and ripe for state intervention. 
Section I of this article discusses the overall pension 
landscape in Rhode Island, including the types of pension plans 
* Andre S. Digou is an associate at Chace Ruttenberg & Freedman, LLP, in 
Providence, Rhode Island, where he practices primarily in the areas of 
corporate law, civil and commercial litigation, and insolvency law.  The views 
expressed herein are of the author only and not the views of Chace 
Ruttenberg & Freedman, LLP or its clients.  
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and plan participants.  Section II of this article focuses on the 
sweeping pension reform enacted by the Rhode Island legislature 
in 2011.  Section III analyzes Rhode Island’s approach to pension 
modifications.  Section IV discusses a unified approach to pensions 
in Rhode Island and potential legislative remedies to the existing 
local pension scheme.  Finally, Section V concludes that, should 
the Rhode Island legislature desire to reform local pension plans, 
the legislature could do so by unifying the existing local pension 
scheme under preemption doctrine principles and without 
modifying existing participants’ benefits. 
I. THE RHODE ISLAND PENSION LANDSCAPE 
A. State-Administered Plans 
Rhode Island, comprised of just thirty-nine cities and towns, 
has four distinct state-administered retirement plans, each of 
which was created pursuant to statute.1 The four state-
administered retirement plans are:  (1) the employee retirement 
system of Rhode Island (“ERSRI”), which includes state employees 
and teachers; (2) the municipal employee retirement system 
(“MERS”), which includes locally funded plans which elect to 
participate in MERS; (3) the Rhode Island State Police Retirement 
Benefits Trust (“SPRBT”); and (4) the Rhode Island Judicial 
Retirement Benefits Trust (“JRBT”) (collectively referred to as the 
“State System”).2  The State pools plan funds for investment 
purposes, and the Rhode Island Retirement Board (“Retirement 
Board”) administers the State System.3 The Rhode Island General 
Treasurer, who is responsible for the State System’s investment 
 1.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-8-1 to -10-40 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2013) (ERSRI); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 45-21-1 to -66 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2013) (MERS); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-28-22 to -22.3 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2013) (SPRBT); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 8-3-8 to -8.2 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2013) (JRBT). 
 2.  To be precise, according to the General Treasurer’s Chief of Staff, in 
2010 there were 113 named plans encompassed in the four state-
administered plans, and 36 locally administered pension plans. See C. 
Eugene Emery Jr., King Says Rhode Island’s Public Employees Have 150 
Different Pension Plans, POLITIFACT (Aug. 30, 2010, 12:01 a.m.), http://www. 
politifact.com/rhode-island/statements/2010/aug/30/kernan-kerry-king/king-
says-rhode-islands-public-employees-have-150-/. So, there are actually 149 
different named pension plans in Rhode Island.  See id.  
 3.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-8-4(a). 
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decisions and setting asset allocation strategies, chairs the 
Retirement Board.4 
The majority of State System participants are covered by a 
defined benefit plan (commonly referred to as a “DB Plan”), which 
means that retirement allowances are calculated using a preset 
formula.5  DB Plans are funded by a combination of employee and 
employer (i.e. the state, city, town or local entity) contributions 
plus investment returns on the funds invested.  Participants with 
DB plans generally receive cost of living adjustment (“COLA”)6 
increases, and retirement eligibility is based on years of credited 
service or satisfying certain age requirements set forth in the 
statutes.7  Retirement allowance is computed using an average of 
the participant’s highest earned salary calculated over three years 
(or five years, depending on the date of retirement eligibility), 
multiplied by the number of credited years of service.8  
Participants receive their retirement allowance in fixed equal 
monthly installments after retirement.9  DB plan contributions 
are not correlated with the performance of plan investments, and 
therefore the employer bears the risk of investment performance 
and accuracy of the plan’s financial assumptions.10 
Some participants, however, are covered by a defined 
contribution plan (commonly referred to as a “DC Plan”) whereby 
retirement allowances are calculated based on the employee’s 
contributions, employer contributions, and investment returns.11  
A DC Plan, unlike a DB Plan, offers the participant an 
opportunity to select investments for their personal account and 
 4.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-8-4, -9. 
 5.  See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-10-9, -10. 
 6.  COLAs are adjustments in contribution percentages that are 
commonly used to combat erosion of pension funds by inflation. Once granted, 
COLA adjustments compound and cause a sharp increase in the funding 
obligation of the funding entity. 
 7.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-10-9 to -9.3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-16-12 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 8.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-8-1(5) (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 38-10-10 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013) (state employees); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 16-16-13 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013) (teachers).  
 9.  See id. 
 10.  See id. 
 11.  See Frequently Asked Questions – Hybrid Plans, STATE OF RHODE 
ISLAND OFFICE OF THE GENERAL TREASURER, http://www.treasury.ri.gov/secure 
-path-ri/rirsa/faq/hybrid-how.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).  
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supplement contributions made by employers up to certain IRS 
monetary limits. Like an individual retirement account, 
participants in a DC Plan receive a lump-sum payment upon 
retirement (which can be converted into an annuity or drawn 
down), and DC Plans are portable to subsequent employment.12  
Under a DC Plan, the employee bears the risk of investment 
performance.13 
Generally, any employee within one of the classes mentioned 
below is required, as a condition of their employment, to become a 
member of one of the state plans.  With the exception of certain 
contractual conditions, the State System covers the following 
classes of employees: 
a) any individual employed by the State in a position for 
20 hours per week or more, 
b) any public school teacher (including administrators 
such as a principal) who is regularly employed on at least 
a half-time basis, 
c) certain Airport Corporation, Economic Development 
Corporation and Narragansett Bay Corporation 
employees, 
d) any correctional officer, 
e) anyone employed as a registered nurse by the 
Department of Behavioral Healthcare or the 
Development Disabilities and Hospitals, 
f) anyone employed by a participating municipality in a 
position for 20 hours a week or more, 
g) any police officer or firefighter who are employees of 
departments that are participants in MERS, 
h) members of the State police hired after July 1, 1987, 
and 
i) all justices and judges of the Supreme, Superior, 
Family, District and Workers’ Compensation Courts, and 
Traffic Tribunal engaged after December 31, 1989.14 
 12.  See id. 
 13.  See id. 
 14.  See EMPS.’ RET. SYS. OF R.I., AN EMPLOYEE’S GUIDE TO 
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ERSRI was created by the Rhode Island General Assembly in 
1936 to benefit state employees, schoolteachers, and participating 
municipal employees by providing retirement benefits.15  The 
state is responsible for funding state employees’ benefits and a 
portion of the benefits for schoolteachers.  As of 2012, ERSRI had 
a total of 25,041 state employee participants, comprised of 11,166 
active members, 11,200 retirees, and 2,675 inactive members.16  
The ERSRI state employee plan was 56.3% funded.17  There was a 
total of 26,642 teacher participants in ERSRI including 13,212 
active members, 10,622 retirees, and 2,808 inactive members.18  
The ERSRI teacher plan was 58.8% funded.19 
In 1951, the General Assembly created MERS, which 
empowered municipalities to allow their employees to enroll in a 
state-administered plan.20  Pursuant to section 45-21-4 of the 
Rhode Island General Laws, each municipality is given the 
opportunity to choose whether to participate in MERS. Upon a 
municipality so choosing, the eligible employees of the 
municipality are required to become MERS participants.  The 
state is responsible for administering MERS, but municipalities 
are obligated to fund MERS participant benefits.  As of June 30, 
2012, MERS was comprised of 113 units, sixty-eight covering 
general municipal employees and forty-five covering police and/or 
fire fighters.21  The contribution rate for each unit is statutorily 
mandated and augmented by contractual agreements; on average, 
UNDERSTANDING THE RHODE ISLAND RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT 4–5 (2012), 
https://www.ersri.org/public/documentation/FINAL_RIRSAGuide_January20
12.pdf [hereinafter EMPLOYEE’S GUIDE]. 
 15.  An Act to Provide for the Retirement of Employees of the State of 
Rhode Island, 1936 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 2334, 868 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§§ 36-8-1 to -10-40).  
 16.  See GABRIEL ROEDER SMITH & CO., EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
OF RHODE ISLAND: ACTUARIAL VALUATION REPORT AS OF JUNE 30, 2012 2 (2012) 
[hereinafter EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT]. 
 17.  See id. 
 18.  See id. at 3. 
 19.  See id. 
 20.  See An Act to Provide for a Retirement and Benefit System for 
Municipal Employees, its Financing and Administration, and its Integration 
with the Federal Social Security Act, 1951 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 2784, 374 
(codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-21-1 to -66). 
 21.  See EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT, supra note 16, at 2.  At the time of 
writing, the most recent date for which actuarial data was available was 
June 30, 2012.   
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MERS is funded 82.5% across all units.22 
The SPRBT was created in 1987 as a separate plan for the 
benefit of state police employees.23 As of June 30, 2012, the 
SPRBT covered 231 active members, ten retirees and four inactive 
members, for a total of 245 participants.24  The plan includes two 
groups that are funded differently.  The state funds participants 
hired prior to 1987 on a pay-as-you-go basis from general assets of 
the state.25  This amount of funding appears as a line item in the 
state’s budget.  A second group of participants, however, is funded 
by a combination of state and employee contributions that are 
statutorily mandated.26  Specifically, as of June 30, 2012, the 
state contributes 17.24% and SPRBT participants contribute 
8.75%.27  The SPRBT was 89.6% funded as of June 30, 2012.28 
The General Assembly created the JRBT in 1987 for the 
benefit of justices and judges of the Rhode Island court system.29  
As of June 30, 2012, the JRBT included fifthy-three active justices 
and judges and twelve retirees, for a total of sixty-five 
participants.30  Like the SPRBT, the JRBT has two groups that 
are funded differently.  Justices and Judges hired prior to January 
1, 1990 are funded from general state assets on a pay-as-you-go 
basis.31  A second group of participants is funded by a combination 
of state and JRBT participant contributions.32  For the JRBT, the 
state contributes 28.32% and participants contribute 12%.33  As of 
 22.  See id. at 28; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-21-42 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009).  
 23.  See 1987 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 118, art. 15, § 3, 275  
 24.  See EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT, supra note 16, at 2. At the time of 
writing, the most recent date for which actuarial data was available was 
June 30, 2012.   
 25.  Id. at 1.  
 26.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-28-22.1 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007). 
 27.  STATE POLICE RETIREMENT BENEFITS VALUATION REPORT, supra note 
24, at 2.  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See 1987 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 118, art. 15, §1, 274. 
 30.  EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT, supra note 16, at 2.  At the time of writing, 
the most recent date for which actuarial data was available was June 30, 
2012.  See id. 
 31.  Id. at 1. 
 32.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 8-3-16, 36-10-1 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2013). 
 33.  JUDICIAL RETIREMENT BENEFITS ACTUARIAL VALUATION, supra note 
30, at 2. 
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June 30, 2012, the JRBT was 83.4% funded.34 
B.  Locally Administered Plans 
In contrast to the state administered pension plans, there are 
thirty-six local pension plans (“LPP” and collectively “Local 
System”) administered by municipalities or local employee 
unions.35  For those municipalities with LPPs, each such 
municipality or employee union is responsible for administering 
and funding LLPs, determining plan provisions, investing plan 
assets, and paying retirement benefits. In addition to LPPs, 
several municipalities have established other post-employment 
benefit plans (“OPEB”) for their employees.  OPEB plans 
generally include health-care benefits for retirees, and each 
municipality is likewise responsible for administering, funding, 
and determining plan provisions, investing plan assets, and 
paying benefits.36 
C. Underfunding 
1. State Plans 
The widespread media coverage and criticism of Rhode 
Island’s underfunded pensions are almost too ubiquitous to 
warrant repeating.  However, brief mention is necessary to 
provide context for the ensuing discussion.  Table 1 demonstrates 
the unfunded liabilities of state-administered plans as of June 30, 
2012. 
  
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See DENNIS E. HOYLE, AUDITOR GENERAL, STATUS OF PENSION AND 
OPEB PLANS ADMINISTERED BY RHODE ISLAND MUNICIPALITIES 1 (Mar. 2010). 
 36.  See id. at 7. 
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Table 1 
 
Plan Funding Unfunded 
Liability 
 
MERS37 
 
Locally Funded 
 
$262,298,831 
 
ERSRI–State 
Employees38 
 
State Funded 
 
$1,876,069,769 
 
ERSRI– 
Teachers39 
 
40% State Funded, 
60% Locally 
Funded 
 
$2,626,781,473 
 
SPRBT40 
 
State Funded 
 
$9,738,000 
 
JRBT41 
 
State Funded 
 
$8,657,000 
  
Total 
 
$4,783,545,073 
 
2.  Local Plans 
The Local System includes twenty-four municipalities that 
administer at least one plan for employee participants.42  Among 
the thirty-six total LPPs, the Rhode Island Auditor General 
identified twenty-three that were considered at risk and 
delineated three categories of risk based on funding levels and the 
percentage of annual required contributions made.  Category 1 
includes seven plans that are funded less than 60% and are 
making less than 80% of the annual required contributions.43  
Category 2 includes twelve plans that are funded less than 60% 
 37.  MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM ACTUARIAL VALUATION, 
supra note 21, at 38. 
 38.  EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM ACTUARIAL VALUATION, supra note 
16, at 13. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  STATE POLICE RETIREMENT BENEFITS ACTUARIAL VALUATION, supra 
note 24, at 20. 
 41.  JUDICIAL RETIREMENT BENEFITS ACTUARIAL VALUATION, supra note 
30, at 20. 
 42.  See HOYLE, supra note 35, at 7. 
 43.  See id. at 10. 
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and are making more than 80% of the annual required 
contributions.44  Category 3 includes four plans that are funded 
more than 60% but are either making less than 80% of the annual 
required contributions or such annual required contributions are 
declining.45 
In total, twenty-three of thirty-six LPPs are considered at 
risk.46  Collectively, as of June 30, 2009, the LPPs were 43% 
funded and had an unfunded actuarial liability of approximately 
$1.9 billion.47  With respect to the OPEB plans administered by 
municipalities, such plans had a collective funding ratio of 1% and 
an unfunded actuarial liability of $2.4 billion.48 
II.  2011 PENSION REFORM 
In 2011, the Rhode Island General Assembly embarked on a 
sweeping reform of the State System and, to some extent, the 
Local System.  Two acts permanently changed the structure of 
pension plans across the state.49  The Rhode Island Retirement 
Security Act (“Retirement Security Act” or “Act”), which made 
substantial changes to the State System, has received far greater 
criticism and scrutiny than its counterpart, the Retirement 
Security Act for Locally Administered Pension Funds (“Local 
Act”), which only affects locally administered plans. 
A. The Retirement Security Act 
The unprecedented Retirement Security Act passed the House 
of Representatives (57-15) and Senate (35-2) on November 17, 
2011 and was signed into law the following day.50 Through the 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  See id. 
 46.  See id. 
 47.  See HOYLE, supra note 35, at 7.  Recently, however, LLPs were 
required to submit financial and funding improvement plans to the State 
pursuant to section 45-65-4 Rhode Island General Laws on or before April 1, 
2012.  Presumably, the Treasurer’s Office is undertaking an analysis of the 
submitted financials and funding improvement plans with an eye toward 
improving the viability of Local Plans. 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  See Rhode Island Retirement Security Act, 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 
408, 1919 [hereinafter Rhode Island Retirement Security Act]; Retirement 
Security Act for Locally Administered Pension Funds Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. §§ 45-65-1 to -9 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012).  
 50.  See Rhode Island Retirement Security Act, supra note 49; see also 
 
DIGOUFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  1:03 PM 
2014] RHODE ISLAND PENSION LANDSCAPE 749 
Retirement Security Act, the General Assembly intends to “ensure 
the sustainability of the state’s public retirement systems.”51  
Section 1 of the Retirement Security Act sets forth sixteen 
legislative findings, which explain in detail the reasoning 
underlying the reform and conclude with the following four 
overarching goals of the Act: 
(1) To ensure that cities and towns will be able to provide 
retirement benefits that will enable our public employees 
to enjoy a dignified retirement. 
(2) To ensure a secure and adequate source of retirement 
funds for public retiree benefits. 
(3) To ensure that the cost of current and future benefits 
is not so great and onerous that it jeopardizes the ability 
and obligation of the state and its town and cities to fund 
the costs of providing our children with an excellent 
public education; rebuilding and sustaining our economy; 
maintaining roads and bridges; providing assistance, 
care, and support of our neediest and most vulnerable 
citizens; and addressing other essential public programs 
and purposes. 
(4) The general assembly expressly finds and declares 
that the situation currently confronting the State of 
Rhode Island’s publicly financed pension systems has 
reached an emergency stage and must be addressed 
without delay and the enactment of the Rhode Island 
Retirement Security Act of 2011 is reasonable and 
necessary to achieve and protect the compelling public 
interests listed herein.  The general assembly further 
finds and declares that the achievement of those 
compelling public interests, on balance, far outweigh any 
impact that such enactment might have upon the 
expectations of active and retired members of the affected 
pension systems as to potential future pension benefits.52 
The Rhode Island Retirement Security Act of 2011 (RIRSA), OFFICE OF THE 
GENERAL TREASURER, available at http://www.treasury.ri.gov/ 
secure-path-ri/rirsa/legislation.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
 51.  Rhode Island Retirement Security Act, supra note 49, § 1. 
 52.  Id. § 16(b)(1)-(4). 
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Prior to enactment, however, the General Treasurer issued a 
report in June 2011 that outlined the factors driving the pension 
system’s structural deficit.53  According to the General Treasurer’s 
report, the pension crisis is attributable to: (1) the failure to utilize 
sound actuarial practices, (2) generous benefit improvements 
without corresponding taxpayer or employee contributions, (3) 
pension plan design,54 (4) retirees living longer, and (5) lower-
than-assumed investment returns.55  With this backdrop, the 
following subsections discuss the key provisions of the Retirement 
Security Act. 
1.  Hybrid Plans 
The Retirement Security Act instituted a hybrid plan for 
ERSRI state employees, teachers, and MERS and altered the DB 
plan for corrections officers, state police, judges, and public safety 
employees.56  Participants retain all benefits accrued as of June 
30, 2012, and eligibility for retirement as of June 30, 2013 
remains unchanged.57 The hybrid plan, however, enrolls 
participants in both a DB plan and a DC plan.  Under the hybrid 
plan, each participant contributes 8.75% of their base pay, of 
which 3.75% is contributed to the DB plan and 5.0% is contributed 
to the DC plan.58  The state (or municipality responsible) also 
contributes 1% to the participant’s DC plan.59 
The hybrid plan, however, was not extended to public safety 
plans or to the JRBT.  The public safety plans and JRBT DB plans 
were subject to revisions under the Act.  General changes to the 
DB plans include limiting service credit multipliers to 1% and 
 53.  See GINA M. RAIMONDO, RHODE ISLAND GENERAL TREASURER, TRUTH 
IN NUMBERS: THE SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF RHODE ISLAND’S 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM (June 2011), available at http://www.treasury. 
ri.gov/documents/SPRI/TIN-WEB-06-1-11.pdf.  
 54.  Specifically, contributions to certain state pension plans, prior to the 
reform, failed to cover the amount of benefits to be paid each year. 
 55.  RAIMONDO, supra note 53, at 3–4.  
 56.  EMPLOYEE’S GUIDE, supra note 14, at 6. 
SPRI/FINAL_RIRSAGuide_January2012.pdf.  
 57.  RHODE ISLAND GEN. ASSEMBLY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RHODE 
ISLAND RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT 5 (2011), available at http://www.pension 
reformri.com/resources/ReportwithGRSAppendix.pdf.  
 58.  Id. at 5–6.  
 59.  Id. at 6. 
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increasing the period used to calculate final average salary from 
three to five years.60  Contributions were adjusted down from 
8.75% to 3.75% effective on July 1, 2012.61 Lastly, the vesting 
period was reduced from ten to five years.62  The specific DB plan 
modifications are discussed herein. 
The MERS plan, which encompasses correctional offices, was 
modified to replace declining contributions after thirty years of 
service with a 2% continuous accrual.63  In addition, the 
maximum benefit was reduced from 80% to 75%.  Correctional 
officer participants continue to contribute 8.75% of their base 
salary and will not participate in the DC plan.64 
The MERS police and fire plans include both a twenty-five-
year plan and a twenty-year plan with each municipality or union 
electing the plan in which to participate.65  The majority of 
participants are in the twenty-year plan.66  Prior to the Act’s 
revisions, under the twenty-five-year plan: (i) a participant could 
retire with full benefits after twenty-five years of credited service 
or upon reaching age fifty-five with ten years of credited service; 
and (ii) the final average salary was based upon the final three 
years of service.67  After the Act’s revisions, all MERS police and 
fire participants are essentially switched to the twenty-five-year 
plan.68  The retirement age requirements are the same, however 
“members age 45 with at least 10 years of service currently 
eligible to retire before 52 to retire at 52; or retire at current 
retirement date but at accrued benefit as of June 30, 2012.”69  The 
final average salary is now based on the last five years of service, 
rather than three years, which effectively reduces the benefit at 
retirement.70  Like the correctional officers, MERS police and fire 
 60.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-10-9, -10 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 61.  Id.  § 36-10-1(a). 
 62.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RHODE ISLAND RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT, 
supra note 57, at 5.  
 63.  Id. at 6. 
 64.  Id. at 7. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
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plans will not participate in the DC plan.71 
The SPRBT DB retirement age was modified to allow 
participants to retire after a participant’s retirement allowance 
reaches 50% and forcing retirement when a participant’s 
retirement allowance reaches 65% or when the participant 
reaches age sixty-two.72  In the event a SPRBT participant does 
not reach 50% retirement allowance by sixty-two, the Act allows 
each such participant to accrue benefits until reaching 50% and 
then to retire.73  Overall, the Act allows a SPRBT participant to 
work up to thirty-three years, whereas prior to the revisions the 
limit was twenty-five years and thirty years depending on hire 
date.74  Lastly, final compensation is calculated based on the last 
five years of service rather than three years.75 
The Act alters the JRBT by creating a 12% contribution rate, 
regardless of whether the participant was contributing prior to 
July 1, 2012.76  Prior to the Act, those who were contributing did 
so at a rate of 8.75%.77 Active Supreme Court justices are 
excluded from the Act’s provisions altering contribution rates 
because of a constitutional provision prohibiting any reduction in 
compensation.78  As mentioned above, members of the JRBT will 
not participate in the DC plan.79 
2. COLAs and Re-Amoritzation  
The Retirement Security Act does not affect COLAs granted 
prior to July 1, 2012 but suspends COLA payments until the 
aggregate funding levels of the State System (specifically ERSRI 
state employees, JRBT and SPRBT) reach 80%.80  There are, 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
    73.     Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 8. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  See id.; R.I. CONST. art. X, § 6 (“Judges of supreme court— 
Compensation.—The judges of the supreme court shall receive a 
compensation for their services, which shall not be diminished during their 
continuance in office.”). 
 79.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RHODE ISLAND RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT, 
supra note 57, at 8. 
 80.  EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND, RHODE ISLAND 
RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT OF 2011 – MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SAFETY 7 (2011), 
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however, interim COLA increases calculated at five-year 
intervals.81  Once the State System reaches the aggregate funding 
goal, COLAs of 0-4% for the first $25,000 of the participants’ 
salary will be awarded based on the funds’ average investment 
returns.82  The key function of the COLA reform provisions is that 
all participants are moved to the same COLA as of July 1, 2012.83  
This ensures that COLAs are only granted when the plans are 
adequately funded. 
The Act’s re-amortization provisions were also a significant 
change from the prior scheme.  As part of the overall reform, 
payment of the existing unfunded liability was extended from the 
scheduled nineteen years to twenty-five years.84  This approach is 
intended to reduce volatility and to lessen the burden at the end of 
the amortization period.85 
B.  Pathway to Retirement Security for Locally Administered 
Pension Funds Act 
The General Assembly enacted the Pathway to Retirement 
Security for Locally Administered Pension Funds Act (“Local 
Pension Act”) “to provide retirement security to current and 
retired municipal employees by codifying standards to promote 
the sustainability and longevity of pension plans established and 
administered by municipalities.”86  It is the legislature’s 
expressed intent “to begin the process of ensuring the 
sustainability of locally administered pension plans and to 
advance and maintain the long-term stability of such plans.”87  
The Local Pension Act governs “any defined benefit pension plan 
established by a municipality for its employees,” but excludes 
plans that: (a) participate in ERSRI or MERS; (b) are established 
by a municipality that has filed under Chapter 9 or Chapter 11 of 
available at https://www.ersri.org/public/documentation/RI_RetirementSecu 
rityActof2011_MERS_%20Pand_F_rev2.pdf; EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RHODE 
ISLAND RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT, supra note 57, at 4. 
 81.  Id. at 7.  
 82.  Id. at 5. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 9. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Retirement Security Act for Locally Administered Pension Funds, 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-65-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 87.  Id. § 45-65-3. 
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the United States Bankruptcy Code; and (c) are established by a 
municipality for which a receiver or fiscal overseer has been 
appointed pursuant to the Fiscal Stability Act (sections 45-9-1 
through 45-9-23 of the Rhode Island General Laws).88  The 
definition of “municipality” in the Local Pension Act embraces 
“any town or city in the State of Rhode Island, any city or town 
housing authority, fire, water, sewer district, regional school 
district or public building authority.”89 
The primary focus of the Local Pension Act is to monitor Local 
Plans through reporting requirements and oversight.90  The Local 
Pension Act established a fourteen-member study commission 
that is charged with reviewing existing legislation and 
recommending changes to improve Local Plan funding levels 
(“Study Commission”).91  Municipalities administering local plans 
are required to submit an annual actuarial valuation to the Study 
Commission on or before April 1, 2012, with subsequent actuarial 
studies to be submitted once every three years.92  Pursuant to the 
Act, the state agreed to subsidize 50% of each municipality’s cost 
 88.  Id. § 45-65-4(4). 
 89.  Id. § 45-65-4(5).  As mentioned above, the Local Pension Act only 
covers DB plans.  A plain reading of the Local Pension Act demonstrates that 
it does not cover DC plans or hybrid plans.  Interestingly, however, the 
Auditor General’s Report recommends that local governments consider 
alternatives to defined benefit plans such as defined contribution plans or 
hybrid plans.89.  It seems odd for the Auditor General to recommend an 
alternative plan that would allow a municipality to administer a plan outside 
the coverage of the Local Pension Act.  Perhaps the recommendation was 
made with further legislative changes in mind.  Furthermore, it is quite 
interesting that the statute refers to a Chapter 11 filing by a municipality 
under the United States Bankruptcy Code.  While it appears evident that 
section 45-65-4(b) was included in response to Central Falls’ Chapter 9 
petition, the inclusion of a Chapter 11 filing in the Local Pension Act 
language begs certain questions.  For instance, was Chapter 11 included 
because the Rhode Island legislature believes that a municipality would be 
eligible for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, or was the reference to Chapter 11 
included in response to the court’s decision in In re Northern Mariana Islands 
Ret. Fund, No. 12-00003, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131709 (US Dist. Ct. 
Northern Mariana Islands, Jun. 13, 2013) (dismissing a Chapter 11 petition 
filed by a government employee retirement fund for lack of eligibility under 
Chapter 11 and reasoning that the fund was an “instrumentality” of the 
government under the Bankruptcy Code).  
 90.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-65-3. 
 91.  Id. § 45-65-8. 
 92.  Id. § 45-65-6(1).  
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of conducting the actuarial study.93  The actuarial studies must 
conform to “accepted actuarial standards and applicable public 
pension accounting laws, rules and regulations.”94  If, as a result 
of the required actuarial study, the actuary determines that the 
Local Plan is in critical status (that is, less than 60% funded), the 
municipality must notify the plan’s participants and beneficiaries, 
the General Assembly, the Governor, the General Treasurer, the 
Director of Revenue, and the Auditor General within thirty 
business days.95 
While largely advisory, the Local Pension Act contains two 
enforcement provisions.  First, if a Local Plan is determined to be 
in critical status, the administrator must submit a “reasonable 
alternative funding improvement plan” to the Study Commission 
within 180 days of the critical status notice required under section 
45-65-6(2) of the Rhode Island General Laws.96  Second, if a Local 
Plan fails to comply with the requirements of the Local Pension 
Act, the general treasurer is authorized to withhold state funds 
due to the municipality “for any purpose other than education, 
including but not limited to, municipal aid provided under §§ 45-
13-5.1, 45-13-12, 44-34.1-2, 44-13-13, 44-18-18.1, 44-18-36.1(b) and 
42-63.1-3.”97  In February 2013, legislation was introduced which 
 93.  Id. § 45-65-6(3). 
 94.  Id. § 45-65-5. 
 95.  Id. § 45-65-6(2). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. § 45-65-7.  Section 45-13-5.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws 
provides for State appropriations in lieu of property taxes for tax-exempt 
entities at a rate of 27% of the total tax that would otherwise have been 
collected.  Section 45-13-12 of the Rhode Island General Laws established a 
distressed communities relief fund whereby qualifying communities could 
receive State assistance yearly, based on the communities’ tax levy relative to 
the total tax levy of all eligible communities.  As of June 2013, qualifying 
communities are eligible to receive up to $784,458 in State assistance.  R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-13-12 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).  Section 44-34.1-2 of 
the Rhode Island General Laws provides a reimbursement to municipalities 
and fire districts from general State revenues “equal to the amount of lost tax 
revenue due to the phase out or reduction of the excise tax.”  Under section 
44-18-18.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws municipalities are eligible to 
receive funds from the State collected a result of taxes, penalties or 
forfeitures, interest, costs of suit and fines” for local meals and beverage 
taxes.  Like local meal and beverage taxes, a municipality is eligible to 
receive from the state “the hotel tax, penalties or forfeitures, interest, costs of 
suit and fines” under sections 44-18-36.1 and 42-63.1-3 of the Rhode Island 
General Laws.  
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proposes to have the General Treasurer deposit any funds 
withheld from municipalities on account of section 45-65-7 of the 
Rhode Island General Laws into an interest bearing escrow 
account for a period of one year.98  At the expiration of the one-
year period, the General Treasurer would deposit the withheld 
funds directly into the Local Plan.99  Under the proposed 
legislation, the General Treasurer has the discretion to: (a) release 
the withheld funds if the municipality submits an adequate 
funding plan; or (b) to seek instructions from the General 
Assembly if the Local Plan from which funds are withheld is 
insolvent or non-existent.100 
The Local Pension Act, in essence, only creates a structure for 
reporting and oversight of Local Plans.  The Act does not alter or 
modify any of the provisions of the Local Plans or impact 
participants’ benefits.  It remains to be seen whether the Local 
Pension Act is a stepping-stone for more sweeping reform like the 
Retirement Security Act enacted for state plans. Certainly, the 
Study Commission and legislators will need sufficient time to 
scrutinize the actuarial valuations and funding improvement 
plans submitted by Local Plans pursuant to section 45-65-6 of the 
Rhode Island General Laws. 
III.  RHODE ISLAND’S APPROACH TO PENSION MODIFICATIONS 
Generally, and in Rhode Island, the legal debate surrounding 
pension reform focuses on the modification of participants’ pension 
benefits.  Commonly, there are three legal frameworks under 
which modifications to pension benefits are analyzed: (a) the 
property approach; (b) the contractual approach; and (c) the 
promissory estoppel approach.  Rhode Island courts have 
recognized, but have not necessarily applied, all three 
approaches.101  The following discussion outlines the approaches 
used by courts applying Rhode Island law to modifications of 
 98.  S. 0522, 2013 Gen. Assemb. Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2013) 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  See R.I. Council 94 v. Carcieri, No. PC 10-2859 (R.I. Super. Ct. filed 
Sept. 13, 2011) (Carcieri II) (discussing changes to the Retirement Security 
Act under the Contracts Clause, Takings Clause, and Promissory Estoppel); 
see also Nonnemacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199 (R.I. 1999) 
(discussing municipal ordinance changing pension benefits under the 
Contracts Clause). 
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pension and/or retiree benefits. 
A.  Property Approach 
The Takings Clause provides that “[p]rivate property shall not 
be taken for public uses, without just compensation.”102  Several 
cases, applying Rhode Island law, recognize the property approach 
to pension modifications under the takings clause.103 The key 
inquiry in a Takings Clause analysis is whether the plaintiff has a 
constitutionally protected contract right to the pension benefits 
being altered.104  Under the property theory, plaintiffs argue that 
a constitutionally protected property right exists in vested pension 
benefits such that modification of benefits by legislative act is a 
taking without just compensation.105 
In R.I. Council 94 v. Carcieri,106 Judge William Smith of the 
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island 
briefly discussed the Takings Clause approach to legislative 
pension modifications.107 The case addressed the State’s 
enactment of section 36-12-4 of the Rhode Island General Laws, 
which reduced the amount the state would contribute to state 
retiree health benefits for employees not yet retired.108  Council 
 102.  R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 103.  See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Emps. Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 
57–59, 62 (1st Cir. 1999); Nat’l Educ. Ass’n - R.I. v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Emps.’ 
Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1999); Carcieri II, No. PC 10-2859 at 12, 
17, 22, 26.  
 104.  See, e.g., Parella, 173 F.3d at 59.  Judge Taft-Carter recognized the 
takings clause approach in Carcieri but limited her analysis to “whether the 
statutorily-created ERSRI pension plan establishe[d] a contractual 
relationship between the State of Rhode Island and ERSRI participants for 
purposes of the Contract and Takings Clauses of the Rhode Island 
Constitution.”  Carcieri II, No. PC 10-2859, at 1–2, 7–9, 12, 39.  Because of 
the procedural posture of the case, Judge Taft-Carter did not actually apply 
the takings clause analysis, but nonetheless held that retirees possessed 
implied unilateral contract rights arising from ERSRI.  Id. at 38-39.  
Presumably, at some point in the continued litigation, Judge Taft-Carter will 
be presented with the opportunity to actually apply a takings clause analysis 
to the 2009 and 2010 ERSRI amendments.  
 105.  See e.g., Carcieri II, No. PC 10-2859, at 12, 17, 22, 26.  
 106.  There are multiple iterations of the case captioned R.I. Council 94 v. 
Carcieri at the state and federal level.  See, e.g., R.I. Council 94 v. Carcieri, 
705 F. Supp. 2d 165, 165 (D.R.I. 2010) (Carcieri I); Carcieri II, No. PC 10-
2859, at 1.  
 107.  Carcieri I, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 165, 182. 
 108.  Id. at 167 (citation omitted).  
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94, a labor union, represented approximately 4,000 employees who 
contracted with the state through collective bargaining 
agreements.109  Council 94 claimed that the state violated the 
Contracts Clause and Takings Clause by enacting legislation that 
reduced the amount of state contributions to retiree health 
benefits.110  Judge Smith began with a Contracts Clause analysis 
(discussed in more detail herein) and ultimately concluded that 
Council 94’s claim failed because the collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”) had properly terminated prior to the state 
enacting the legislation that altered benefits and because there 
was no language in the CBA that extended the expected benefits 
beyond the termination of the CBA.111  Therefore, the retirees had 
no contractual relationship upon which to base their claim.112 
Judge Smith next, when addressing the legislative change to 
retiree benefits, recognized that the “Takings Clause forbids the 
taking of private property for public use without just 
compensation.”113 However, because Council 94 failed to 
demonstrate that a valid contractual right to future retiree health 
benefits existed, Judge Smith determined that Council 94 “failed 
to allege sufficient facts that would support a Takings Clause 
claim.”114  Judge Smith’s treatment of the issue in Council 94 v. 
Carcieri suggests that, with the appropriate facts, a plaintiff could 
be successful under the Takings Clause against legislative 
modification of post-employment benefits.115 
Similarly, in a later Rhode Island Superior Court iteration of 
Council 94 v. Carcieri, Judge Taft-Carter addressed legislative 
changes to the ERSRI statutory scheme that increased the 
retirement age, decreased the amount of service allowances, and 
reduced COLAs.116  Judge Taft-Carter undertook an extensive 
discussion of pension cases in Rhode Island, but her analysis 
focused on the Contract Clause without reaching the Takings 
 109.  Id. at 168. 
 110.  Id. at 173. 
 111.  Id. at 174–77. 
 112.  Id. at 177. 
 113.  Id. at 182 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16).   
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id. 
 116.  R.I. Council 94 v. Carcieri, No. PC 10-2859 (R.I. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 
13, 2011) (Carcieri II) 1, 4, 6–7.  
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Clause.117  Nonetheless, Judge Taft-Carter’s holding in Council 94 
v. Carcieri is instructive on pension modification claims advanced 
under the Takings Clause because she determined that long-term 
state employees “possess implied unilateral contract rights arising 
from the ERSRI” statutory scheme.118  As a practical matter, 
Judge Taft-Carter essentially established the property right upon 
which the long-term state employee ERSRI participants could 
maintain a Takings Clause claim. 
B.  Contractual Approach 
Unlike other states, Rhode Island has no constitutional 
provision explicitly protecting pension benefits.119  As a result, 
challenges to pension modifications are commonly brought under 
the Contracts Clause of the Rhode Island and/or the United States 
Constitutions.120 The Contracts Clauses of both constitutions 
prohibit states from enacting any law impairing the obligations of 
contracts.121  The Rhode Island constitution provides that “[n]o ex 
post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall 
be passed.”122  Several Rhode Island cases present a similar fact 
pattern:  a plaintiff seeks to invalidate a state or local law that 
impacts their pension or retirement benefits on the basis that a 
contract existed between the plaintiff and the state or local 
entity.123 
For example, in Nonnemacher v. City of Warwick, two retiree 
 117.  Id. at 9–39. 
 118.  Id. at 39.  
 119.  Id. at 13–14.  “Over the past century, a number of states have passed 
constitutional amendments protecting the contractual right of public 
employees to their pensions in varying degrees . . . Rhode Island, however, 
has no such provision.”  Id. at 14 (citation omitted). 
 120.  See, e.g., Nonnemacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1200 (R.I. 
1999); see also Carcieri II, No. PC 10-2859, at 13–14 (explaining that in 
“states without clear constitutional or statutory provisions” protecting 
contractual rights in employee pensions, “a growing number have adopted 
the view that public employees possess implied-in-fact contractual rights to 
their statutorily-created pensions.”). 
 121.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; R.I. CONST. art. I, §12.  
 122.  R.I. CONST. art. I, §12. 
 123.  See, e.g., City of Newport v. Local 1080, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters 54 
A.3d 976, 978 (R.I. 2012); Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 381-86 
(R.I. 2007); Nonnenmacher, 722 A.2d at 1200; Carcieri II, No. PC 10-2859, at 
2.  
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firefighters challenged a 1980 Warwick ordinance that reduced 
disability retirement payments by income earned from other 
employment.124  Prior to the 1980 amendment, firefighters were 
entitled to 66.66% of their then-current salary upon disability 
retirement without the income setoff.125  The plaintiffs argued 
that, by enacting the offset provision, the ordinance violated the 
Contracts Clause.126 
In evaluating the ordinance, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
set forth a three-pronged analysis for determining whether a state 
or municipal law impermissibly impairs the obligation of 
contracts.127  First, the court must determine if a contract 
exists.128  Second, the court must determine if the contract was 
impaired and whether such impairment is substantial.129  If the 
impairment is substantial, the court must then determine 
whether the impairment is reasonable and necessary to serve a 
legitimate public purpose.130  As mentioned previously, Judge 
Taft-Carter recently followed this three-pronged approach in 
Council 94 v. Carcieri where two labor unions’ challenged 2009 
and 2010 amendments to ERSRI that impacted retiree benefits.131  
Judge Taft-Carter’s holding, that retired pension participants 
“possess implied unilateral contract rights arising from the 
ERSRI” statutory scheme, has the practical effect of satisfying the 
first element of the Contracts Clause analysis.132 
 124.  Nonnemacher, 722 A.2d at 1201.  
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 1200. 
 127.  Id.  The Supreme Court of the United States developed this three-
part test in General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186–87 (1992) and 
Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 
411-12 (1983).  Rhode Island Courts have applied this test in other contracts 
clause cases.  See e.g., R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 
95, 106 (R.I. 1995); Carcieri II No. PC 10-2859, at 2.  
 128.  Nonnenmacher, 722 A.2d at 1202 (citing McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88 
F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
 129.  Id. (citing Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411–12).   
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Carcieri II, at 4, 7, 10.  
 132.  Id. at 39.  Judge Taft-Carter is currently presiding over five pension 
challenge cases including Rhode Island Superior Court Case Nos. 12-3166, 
12-3167, 12-3168, 12-3169 and 12-3579; the parties in these consolidated 
cases have been in settlement discussions for over a year.  Ted Nesi, RI 
Pension Settlement Talks Continue Into February, WPRI (Feb. 3, 2014), 
http://wpri.com/2014/02/03/ri-pension-settlement-talks-continue-into-
february/.  On February 14, 2014, the parties reached a proposed settlement 
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Because Rhode Island courts were faced with attempts to 
modify existing pension benefits, the legal analysis and discussion 
did not focus on the potential for improving the long-term viability 
of pension plans without modification.  This is no fault of the 
courts; rather it was a response to the factual scenario presented.  
There exists a legal framework, in the context of pension plan 
improvement, which has not been explored and may present a 
viable alternative to modification as the primary means for 
pension plan improvement. 
IV.  IMPROVEMENT OF THE LOCAL PENSION SYSTEM USING A UNIFIED 
APPROACH AND THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
While the discussion above includes cases where existing 
benefits were altered by state legislation or local law in an 
attempt to approve the long-term viability of pension plans, the 
following discussion shifts the focus from modification towards an 
alternative approach—unifying the Local System using the 
preemption doctrine. 
Rhode Island has thirty-six local pension plans administered 
by municipalities or local employee unions.133  In 2011, the state 
began monitoring Local Plans through the Local Pension Act, 
which contains certain reporting requirements.134 Even though 
the Local Pension Act was an important step in developing a plan 
to move Local Pensions towards fiscal strength, the General 
Treasurer recognized that the state must consider whether state 
agreement that has been presented to interested parties for ratification.  For 
a copy of the settlement proposal, see SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2014),  
available at http://ripensioninfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ 
Settlement-Agreement.pdf.  In general, the proposed settlement agreement 
sought to amend the Retirement Security Act by (1) reinstating certain COLA 
payments, (2) adjusting contribution rates, and (3) creating a retirement age 
transition period. See Exhibit B to Settlement Agreement.  While the 
proposed settlement retracted some of the modifications brought by the 2011 
legislation, many of the provisions aimed at correcting the structural deficit 
remain intact. It now seems that the proposal has been rejected and litigation 
will commence. Kaylen Auer, Judge Rules State Worker Union Pension 
Lawsuit Can go to Trial, PROVIDENCE BUS. NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014, 8:58 AM), 
http://pbn.com/Judge-rules-state-worker-union-pension-lawsuit-can-go-to-
trial,96497.  
 133.  Retirement Security Act for Locally Administered Pension Funds, 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-64-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 134.  Id. 
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legislation is necessary to enable reform of the Local Pensions.135  
Presumably, the legislation contemplated would include merging 
the Local Plans with one of the state-administered plans or 
bringing the Local Plans under the administrative umbrella of the 
state. 
The idea of merging Local Plans into one of the state-
administered plans is not a novel one.  In 2011, the Auditor 
General recommended that Local Plans be merged into MERS and 
that the state consider legislative changes to eliminate the 
obstacles to merging Local Plans into MERS.136  One of the 
primary obstacles cited by the Auditor General is the 
nonconforming benefit structure of Local Plans.137  In addition, 
the Auditor General recommended that the state consider 
legislation that would remove pension benefits from municipal 
collective bargaining agreements and/or revise the MERS benefit 
structure.138  The advantages to unifying the Local Plans with a 
State Plan include reduced administrative costs, increased 
investment performance, increased transparency, and reduction of 
investment risk.  Similar benefits could be obtained by the State’s 
assumption of the administration of Local Plans.  
The most apparent benefit of such an arrangement would be 
the immediate reduction of administrative costs by eliminating 
the several municipalities’, unions’, or local pension boards’ 
obligations to administer the thirty-six Local Plans.  The Auditor 
General also recommended pooled investments for Local Plans to 
accomplish similar goals.139  Similarly, the Director of Revenue 
suggested that the Study Commission recommend legislation to 
correct challenges facing the Local Systems if necessary.140  The 
General Treasurer has also suggested that state legislation may 
be necessary to improve Local Plans.141 
 135.  See Gina M. Raimondo, Next Up: Reforming Local Pension Plans, 
PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 21, 2011, at B6. 
 136.  HOYLE, supra note 35, at 33–39.   
 137.  Id. at 32. 
 138.  Id. at 34, 37. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See ROSEMARY BOOTH GALLOGLY, DEP’T OF REVENUE, OVERSIGHT OF 
MUNICIPAL FINANCES AND LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED PENSION PLANS IN RHODE 
ISLAND, 50 (Dec. 6, 2012). 
 141.  Ted Nesi, Raimondo: Move 36 Local Pension Plans into State-Run 
System, WPRI (Jan. 30, 2012), http://blogs.wpri.com/2012/01/30/raimondo-
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Foreshadowed by the suggestions of the Auditor General, 
Director of Revenue, and the General Treasurer, the state is 
presumably considering legislation that would:  (a) merge local 
plans with one of the state-administered plans (i.e. MERS); (b) 
bring Local Plans under state administration, even if not joined 
with one of the state-administered plans; and (c) enable Local 
Plans to pool investments.  While the Auditor General, Director of 
Revenue, and General Treasurer have suggested that state 
legislation may be necessary to improve the Local System; there 
has been little public discussion, if any, on how the State might 
accomplish its goal.  Assuming the State determines it is prudent 
to enact legislation to accomplish any of the above-mentioned 
methods to improve the Local System, the State will find a legal 
framework for its local pension reform in the preemption doctrine. 
A.  Preemption of Municipal Laws 
As mentioned above, a local authority or employee union 
administers the thirty-six Local Plans in Rhode Island.142  These 
Local Plans exist pursuant to the cities’ or towns’ constitutional 
right to govern local matters. Specifically, the Rhode Island 
Constitution affords cities and towns the “right to self government 
in all local matters” but reserves to the state the “power to act in 
relation to the property, affairs and government of any city or 
town by general laws which shall apply alike to all cities and 
towns.”143  Currently, municipal ordinances and local laws (and, 
to a certain extent, collective bargaining agreements) govern the 
administration, funding, provisions, investments, and payment of 
pension benefits for Local Plans.144  In order for the State to bring 
Local Plans under the auspices of state administration, the state 
could preempt the entire field of local pension governance by 
enacting a statewide legislative scheme for local plans. 
To determine whether statewide legislation overruling the 
local pension ordinances is permissible, Rhode Island courts would 
apply well-established principles of the preemption doctrine to the 
move-36-local-pension-plans-into-state-run-system/.   
 142.  Retirement Security Act for Locally Administered Pension Funds, 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-64-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 143.  See R.I. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1, 4.  
 144.  See, e.g., BRISTOL TOWN CODE art. IV, § 21-101 (1998); CRANSTON, R.I. 
CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-20-010 (2012). 
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state’s legislative action.145  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
pronounced the preemption doctrine as follows:  “[a] state statute 
preempts municipal ordinances when either the language in the 
ordinance contradicts the language in the statute or when the 
Legislature has intended to ‘thoroughly occupy the field.’”146  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court’s (“Court”) analysis of the 
relationship between a state statute and a municipal law or 
ordinance is guided by two central inquiries.147  First, the Court 
must determine whether there is a direct and material conflict 
between the two laws.148  To resolve whether a conflict exists, the 
court must examine the intent of the “legislature when it enacted 
the statute.”149   
Second, the Court must decide “whether the General 
Assembly intended that its statutory scheme completely occupy 
the field of regulation on a particular subject.”150  To answer the 
second inquiry, the Court must ask whether “state control is to be 
exclusive or whether the control is to be exercised concurrently by 
the state and by the municipality.”151  The Court has said that 
where the General Assembly has enacted a complex statutory 
scheme, it is evidence that the state intended to occupy the 
field.152  Therefore, in order for the state to improve Local Plans 
by merging them into one of the state-administered plans or 
taking over Local Plans administration, the state should include 
its legislative intent in the statute and enact a complex statutory 
scheme that is broad in scope and applies evenly to all cities, 
towns and local entities. 
To satisfy preemption principles any proposed state 
legislation should definitively express the state’s intent.  For 
example, the state expressed its intent to reform the State System 
in the Retirement Security Act.  Specifically, the state pronounced 
 145.  See Coastal Recycling, Inc. v. Connors, 854 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I. 2004); 
Town of E. Greenwich v. O’Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 109 (R.I. 1992). 
 146.  Connors, 854 A.2d at 715 (quoting O’Neil, 617 A.2d at 109). 
 147.  See State ex rel. City of Providence v. Auger, 44 A.3d 1218, 1229–30 
(R.I. 2012). 
 148.  Id. at 1229 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id. at 1230 (quoting Grasso Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Sepe, 962 A.2d 1283, 
1289 (R.I. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151.  Wood v. Peckham, 98 A.2d 669, 671 (R.I. 1953). 
 152.  See Town of East Greenwich v. O’Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 110 (R.I. 1992). 
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that the legislation was intended to “ensure the sustainability of 
the state’s public retirement systems.”153 A similar 
pronouncement for local plans should satisfy a court’s inquiry into 
the state’s intent to occupy the field.154  Second, any proposed 
legislation reform should apply evenly to all local plans within the 
state, to ensure that the legislation complies with the home rule 
provisions of the Rhode Island Constitution.155  Such a broad 
state statutory scheme should satisfy a court’s inquiry into 
whether the state intended to occupy the entire field of regulation.  
Lastly, the state should include in any proposed legislation the 
determination that the state intends to thoroughly, completely 
and exclusively occupy the field of local pension governance.  This 
will ensure that any municipal laws or local ordinances that 
attempt to govern local pensions will be in direct conflict with the 
state scheme, and therefore invalid. 
Perhaps most importantly, the state could reform the Local 
System without modifying existing pension or retiree benefits, 
thereby avoiding the constitutional challenges discussed in 
Section III supra.  With carefully crafted legislation, the state 
could take over administration of the Local Plans but would not 
assume the obligation to fund such plans or modify benefit 
provisions.  Admittedly, a state scheme that only assumed 
responsibility for administering the Local Plans would not rectify 
the structural problems facing Local Plans.  But, state assumption 
of Local Plans administration would obtain the costs savings 
recognized by the General Treasurer, including reduced 
administrative costs, increased investment performance, 
increased transparency, and reduction of investment risk. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The foregoing provides an analysis of the preemption 
framework under which legislation could be enacted to improve 
the viability of Local Plans and meet the goals identified by the 
General Treasurer, Director of Revenue, and Auditor General.  
While the legislature took the important first step of monitoring 
 153.  Rhode Island Retirement Security Act, supra note 49, at ch. 408, § 1. 
 154.  See State ex rel. City of Providence v. Auger, 44 A.3d 1218, 1230-31 
(R.I. 2012). 
 155.  See R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 4. 
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Local Plans, the fractionalized local system presents an 
opportunity to address a problem of statewide concern with 
serious implications on the State’s economic future and the 
financial well being of its employees and residents.   
Given the pervasive and growing nature of unfunded pension 
liabilities in Rhode Island, using the preemption doctrine as their 
tool, the State’s fiscal leaders and lawmakers should carefully 
assess the potential for implementing a statewide legislative 
scheme that would preempt municipal and local laws governing 
Local Plans in an effort to improve the local pension system. 
 
 
 
